Systematic risk and liquidity : an empirical study comparing Norwegian equity certificates before and after the regulation in 2009 by Hatlevik, Håkon & Einvik, Christian
 Håkon Hatlevik  
Christian Einvik  
 
 
 
 
BI Norwegian Business School 
Master Thesis 
 
 
Systematic risk and liquidity: 
 
An empirical study comparing Norwegian equity 
certificates before and after the regulation in 2009  
 
 
 
Supervisor: 
Dag Michalsen 
 
 
 
Submission date    BI Oslo                  Deadline 
26.08.2013       02.09.2013 
 
 
GRA 19003  
Master Thesis 
 
Master of Science in Business and Economics, Major in Finance 
 
 
This thesis is part of the Master of Science programme at BI Norwegian Business School. The school takes no 
responsibility for the methods used, results found and conclusions drawn.
Master Thesis GRA 19003  02.09.2013 
Page i 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is concluding a five-year Master of Science program in Business and 
Economics with a Major in Finance at BI Norwegian Business School. We would 
like to thank our supervisor, Dag Michalsen, for guidance and advice during the 
process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nydalen, August 2013 
 
 
______________     _____________ 
Christian Einvik     Håkon Hatlevik   
Master Thesis GRA 19003  02.09.2013 
Page ii 
Summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2009, the Norwegian savings banks industry was subject to a regulation 
change, which resulted in a modification of the instrument issued by these banks. 
Thus, in this empirical study we compare the systematic risk and liquidity of 
equity certificates issued by Norwegian savings banks before and after the 
regulation change. We go about estimating systematic risk and liquidity using 
regression analysis. In order to estimate systematic risk we use the empirical 
model of the CAPM often referred to as the “Single index model”. We apply the 
liquidity cost measure developed by Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) to evaluate 
whether liquidity cost (which is a proxy for liquidity) has changed between the 
two sample periods. Our findings suggest that the systematic risk of equity 
certificates has increased, however we are unable to pinpoint whether the source 
for change is the regulation in 2009 or changed market dynamics due to the 
largest financial turmoil in modern time. Concerning liquidity, we are unable to 
draw any definite conclusions related to change. This is due to the weak 
robustness of our tests, which will make any conclusion drawn unreliable. We are 
however able to state that primary capital certificates seemed to be characterized 
by continuations in excess return related to order flow. On the contrary, this does 
not seem to be the case for the modified instrument.   
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1.0 Norwegian Savings Banks 
Norway’s first savings bank, Christiania Sparebank, was established in 1822. It had 
the objective of working against poverty by letting people from the local community 
both make deposits and borrow money if needed (The Norwegian Savings Banks 
Association 2009f).  Traditionally, savings banks in Norway have been organized as 
ownerless firms, where the equity essentially has been consisting of ownerless capital 
which has been built up through retained profits (The Norwegian Savings Banks 
Association 2009a). This structure implies that investors have no claims to earnings, 
which again means that savings banks have been able to give back to their local 
communities through CSR activities. Over the years, Norwegian savings banks have 
had a very strong market position. This also applies today, as savings banks 
(including DNB) holds more than 70% of the Norwegian deposit market, summing 
up to 2,517 billion NOK as of 2009 (The Norwegian Savings Banks Association 
2009e). Due to their complex nature, we will describe the most important features 
related to Norwegian savings banks. 
1.0.1 Development in Number of Savings Banks 
The number of savings banks has changed rapidly over the past century. In the 1920’s 
there were more than 600 savings banks in Norway. In the decades following the 
Second World War the industry experienced a sharp decline in number of banks as 
the customers became gradually wealthier, and the need for expertise increased 
(Exhibit 1). The decline was mainly due to mergers between banks in order to meet 
the increased demand for expertise and larger borrowing amounts (The Norwegian 
Savings Banks Association 2009g). As of November 2012 there were 110 savings 
banks remaining (The Norwegian Savings Banks Association 2013).  
1.0.2 Savings Bank Structures 
Today, Norwegian savings banks are split into three different categories regarding 
structure (Ministry of Finance 2009c):  
- Traditional savings bank (Ownerless firm) 
- Savings banks with equity certificates (Partially ownerless, partially investors) 
- Savings banks with issued stocks/limited companies (Requirement of 
minimum 10% ownerless capital) 
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New laws concerning Norwegian savings banks have emerged over the years, and 
consequently new structures have appeared. However, the main purpose of the 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance has always been to maintain the characteristics and 
uniqueness of savings banks. One of the intentions behind the regulations has been to 
make it easier for banks to raise capital without having to change company form to 
limited company. An additional measure was the minimum requirement of 10% 
ownerless capital in order to be considered a savings bank (The Norwegian Savings 
Banks Association 2009a). This will apply if the bank chooses to issue stocks. If they 
do not satisfy this requirement, they are not eligible to be called a savings bank and 
would thus be characterized as a commercial bank. The reasons why banks would 
like to be characterized as savings banks are related to, among other things, local 
affiliation, and ownership and voting structure. 
1.0.3 CSR Activities 
An important trait of Norwegian savings banks through the years has been the gifts 
they give to the local communities. Such CSR activities can typically be donations to 
sports teams, cultural activities, young entrepreneurs or educational purposes.  The 
total CSR spending in 2009 amounted to 460 million NOK. This was a significant 
reduction from the previous year’s 680 million, due in particular to the financial crisis 
(The Norwegian Savings Banks Association 2009c).    
1.1 Primary Capital Certificates 
Savings banks were until 1988 organized as ownerless firms, and as such had no 
owners who could provide additional funding. The Ministry of Finance introduced in 
1987 a new law that would take effect in June 1988 considering banks capital 
requirement. The new law required a Core Tier 1 capital of minimum 8% for both 
commercial and savings banks (Law December 18
th
 2009 nr. 1603 §2-9b about 
financing activities). The new law was based on the “Capital Accord” of 1988 created 
by the Basel Committee at the Bank of International Settlements (The Norwegian 
Savings Banks Association 2001). The purpose of “Capital Accord” was to establish 
a standard for large international banks in order to: 
- Strengthen the solvency and stability of the international banking sector 
- Reduce differences in competitiveness due to different capital requirements 
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For traditional (ownerless) savings banks, retained earnings would not be sufficient to 
meet the new requirements, given that their Core Tier 1 capital base was significantly 
lower than 8%. Many of the savings banks do not have high enough market 
capitalization today to meet the NOK 300 million requirement to perform an IPO to 
raise capital (Exhibit 2), and thus only a few banks would be able to issue stocks on 
Oslo Stock Exchange (AF Kommunepartner 2012). This was also the case in 1987. 
Consequently, the new regulation introduced in 1987 gave savings banks the 
opportunity to issue “primary capital certificates”. This was because the Ministry of 
Finance did not want to introduce a capital requirement law that would benefit 
commercial banks from a competitive perspective, or motivate savings banks to 
change company form. As a result, they made it possible for savings banks to raise 
capital through a new security called primary capital certificate. This enabled the 
savings banks to raise additional funds to meet the new capital requirement. The 
capital raised through primary capital certificates would count as Core Tier 1 capital 
under the provisions governing capital adequacy (The Norwegian Savings Banks 
Association 2009a).  
The new security gave the holder only limited ownership to the company’s capital. 
As follows, investors did not have ownership to all of the company’s assets, profits or 
capital. They were only entitled to the portion of primary capital to total capital. For 
instance, if the primary capital certificates holders owned 25% of the total capital, 
they were entitled to 25% of the profits. 
1.1.1 The Committee of Representatives 
In contrast to limited companies where the general assembly elects the board of 
directors, whom work as decision makers, savings banks and have a different 
structure. Their equivalent to the board of directors is the “committee of 
representatives”, who are elected in accordance with the law, and specified in the 
savings banks statute. According to the law about savings banks, there are certain 
constraints regarding the composition of the committee of representatives. In 
traditional savings banks the control of the company is split between three parties; 
employees, local authority and customers. The law states that the two latter should 
represent a minimum of ¾.  
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Figure 1: Composition of Committee of Representatives in Traditional Savings Banks 
For savings banks with primary capital certificates the arrangement was slightly 
different as a new party, the security holders, were introduced. The law of primary 
capital certificates stated that the local authorities and the customers should have an 
equal number of representatives, and that the primary capital certificate holders and 
employees should have ¼ of the representatives each (Halvorsen 2006). This meant 
that all of the four parties should represent ¼ of the committee of representatives, 
which implied that the owners would never have the majority of votes. 
Figure 2: Composition of Committee of Representatives in Primary Capital Certificate Banks 
The capital structure also changed when converting to primary capital certificate bank 
as the ownerless firm went from having no capital claimants to having liabilities to 
security holders. In the new model (Exhibit 3), profits were split between two parties 
according to their share of the bank’s capital; the primary capital certificate holders, 
who owns 5% – 90% of the bank’s capital, and the ownerless capital (The Norwegian 
Savings Banks Association 2009b). The security holder’s share of the profits was 
most often distributed as dividends, while the ownerless capital was restrained by law 
to distribute a maximum of 25% of their share of the profits (The Norwegian Savings 
Banks Association 2009d). The security holder’s profits which were not distributed in 
a given year was added to an equalization fund, which had the intention of smoothing 
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out dividends when savings banks had low or negative profits. The banks were 
allowed to have different dividend policies subject to what the committee of 
representatives approved, but the general consensus was that there should be a 
relatively high and constant dividend flow (The Norwegian Savings Banks 
Association 2009a).  
The primary capital certificate holders would, as described above, have a maximum 
of 25% of the votes, unconditional on their ownership share of the total capital. They 
would consequently be unable to overrule how the profits should be distributed or if 
mergers and acquisitions could take place. 
1.1.2 Dilution Effect 
Since savings banks are linked to the region which they are located in, both through 
the committee of representatives and their customers, distributions from the 
ownerless capital are given to the local community through CSR activities. Keeping 
in mind that the ownerless part of the firm was, as described above, restrained to 
distribute maximum 25% of the profits as gifts. The proceeds that were not 
distributed resulted in an increase in ownerless capital. Consequently, this led to an 
increased ownership share for the ownerless part of the firm, while the ownership 
share of the primary capital certificates remained constant. This meant that the 
primary capital certificate holder’s share of the total capital was diluted from one year 
to the next. This dilution effect was continuous as long as the banks had positive 
earnings (Pedersen 2003). If the banks were to run a deficit on the other hand, the 
primary certificate capital was given seniority over the additional portions of the 
equity, after the equalization fund was depleted (Exhibit 4). In other words, this 
implied that deficits would in fact result in an increased ownership share for primary 
capital certificate holders since the ownerless capital would be depreciated before the 
primary certificate capital. In short, the key intuition was that the distribution of 
earnings (Exhibit 3) was not proportional to the ownership ratios, and for that reason 
it would result in a dilution of ownership for investors. To counteract this dilution 
effect, secondary equity offerings and public divestiture were quite common from 
time to time.   
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The dilution effect experienced by investors would, in years with positive earnings, 
be seen as a negative aspect of primary capital certificates both for foreign and 
institutional investors. A report from ABG Securities (2000) on behalf of 
Sparebankforeningen gave an assessment of primary capital certificates and its 
attractiveness to investors. They observed decreasing interest from foreign and 
institutional investors, and consequently the turnover had dropped from 1996-2000 
(Exhibit 5), which again contributed to reduced attractiveness of the instrument (ABG 
Securities 2000). This was also observable in the composition of investors of primary 
capital certificates compared to the Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index from 
2006. 
Figure 3: Ownership Ratios of GFBX and OSEBX in 2006   
1.2 Equity Certificates 
In 2009, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance received an assessment from the banking 
regulatory commission (sub division of the Ministry of Finance) who wanted to 
modernize the regulations of primary capital certificates. Their aspiration was to 
make the primary capital certificates more attractive to investors and more similar to 
regular stocks. Moreover, they wanted to maintain the characteristics of savings 
banks and enable easier accessibility to capital without having to change company 
form to limited company (Ministry of Finance 2009d). In the press release of April 
2009 the Ministry of Finance accepted the proposed regulation changes to the law of 
1988 (Ministry of Finance 2009b). 
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The Ministry of Finance was according to Tore Øystein Gløersen (bank analyst at 
Terra Markets) initially against the regulation changes, but due to the broad 
consensus within the industry, an agreement was made to change the regulations to 
counteract changes in the banks characteristics and role in the Norwegian market 
(Gløersen 2012). The new law was introduced by the Ministry of Finance June 29
th
 
the same year (Ministry of Finance 2009a). The new regulation brought about the 
transition from primary capital certificates to equity certificates. 
1.2.1 The 30/60 Rule 
The new instrument gave savings banks the opportunity to raise equity like before; 
however the security now had closer resemblance to common stocks rather than a 
dividend paying fixed income instrument. This was due to, among other things, the 
new 30/60-rule, and the opportunity of having a new composition within the 
committee of representatives. The 30/60 rule meant that if savings banks wanted to 
give out more than 30% of their profits as dividends or gifts, they would have to 
report to the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway. If they were to exceed 60%, 
they would have to ask for approval. The intention was that payouts now would be 
proportional to the ownership ratios (Ministry of Finance 2009c). By introducing this 
law, the Ministry of Finance wanted to eliminate the dilution effect which had 
characterized the primary capital certificates. This law thus opened for higher CSR 
spending, but limited the dividend payout of equity certificates compared to primary 
capital certificates. The priority list (Exhibit 4) would still be intact after 2009 such 
that the equity certificate capital was “protected”. The ownerless capital would 
accordingly work as a cushion for investors in the case of deficits. Consequently, 
deficits would result in an increased ownership share for equity certificate holders as 
it had been with the previous security. This is also why a Norwegian equity research 
analyst Jon Gunnar Pedersen in 2009 characterized the equity certificates as a super 
stock protected by the equity (Becker 2009). The twofold structure, consisting of both 
the ownerless capital and the equity share capital would accordingly be beneficial to 
equity certificate holders compared stock holders.  
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1.2.2 Composition of the Committee of Representatives 
The new structure of equity certificates had more or less the same characteristics as 
primary capital certificates, but as mentioned, some changes were made (Exhibit 6). 
The 30/60 rule set restrictions on payouts to prevent dilution of ownership. The 
possible composition of the committee of representatives also changed, and it opened 
for other allocations than the previous 25% from each of the four parties. The new 
law gave room for increased influence for equity certificate holders, as they could 
have 20-40% of the representatives (Law December 10
th
 2004 nr. 81 §8 about savings 
banks).  
 
Figure 4: Composition of Committee of Representatives in Equity Certificate Banks 
In the previous arrangement, the security holder would never be able to vote against 
mergers and acquisitions as they had less than 1/3 of the votes. The new regulation 
therefore made the security more equal to common stocks also from an influential 
point of view, as security holders would have the opportunity to vote against such 
significant changes.   
1.2.3 Structural Changes after 2009 
After the new law was introduced in 2009 the banks got new opportunities to choose 
different ways of organizing transformation, mergers and capital structure. This made 
savings banks able to choose different structural- and alliance models in the following 
years. Moreover, in many banks, the ownerless capital has been separated from the 
operations to be part of a “foundation”, while the banking operations continue in a 
“new” savings bank or as a limited company. According to the law, the foundation is 
required to be a long term steady investor that should maintain the traditional CSR 
activities of savings banks (Sparebankstiftelsen DNB 2012).  In 2002 the banks got 
the opportunity to convert to limited companies, but as mentioned above, they needed 
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at least 10% ownerless capital. Thus, in 2002 DNB (former DNB-NOR) changed 
company form to limited company and established a foundation named 
“Sparebankstiftelsen DNB” (Sparebankstiftelsen DNB 2002). After the regulation 
change in 2009, an increasing number of banks also changed to a similar structure 
where a foundation takes over the ownerless capital in the bank. The result was; two 
new foundations established in 2009, seven in 2010, five in 2011 and five in 2012 
(Exhibit 7).  
2.0 Research Question 
Based on the transition from primary capital certificates to equity certificates, we 
want to assess the characteristics of the two securities.  
The objectives of this empirical study are to:  
- Measure and compare systematic risk of the security issued by savings banks 
before and after the regulation in 2009. 
- Measure and compare the impact of volume traded on expected security 
excess returns before and after the regulation in order to assess change in 
liquidity. 
We expect to find that that the systematic risk of the instrument of savings banks has 
increased after 2009. This is because the regulators set restrictions on dividend 
payouts to counteract the dilution effect, which again would reduce the resemblance 
to steady dividend paying fixed income instrument. Thus, we would expect the 
correlation to market movements to increase. Furthermore, we expect that the cost of 
liquidity, according to the liquidity proxy developed by Pástor and Stambaugh 
(2003), decreases. This is because literature by Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt (2007) 
suggest that dividend and liquidity act as substitutes to investors. As the new 
regulations restricted dividend payouts, we expect the liquidity to have increased. 
Additionally, the reduced dilution effect and the opportunity of increased influence 
could have resulted in increased attractiveness of equity certificates. As a result, this 
might have contributed to increased liquidity. If the results are in line with our 
expectations, it may be supporting evidence that the regulation has brought about the 
desired effects. 
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We want to test two hypotheses: 
1) H0: There is no change in the systematic risk of equity certificates in Norway 
before and after 2009 
2) H0: There is no change in the cost of liquidity of equity certificates in Norway 
before and after 2009 
3.0 Literature Review 
By introducing primary capital certificates in 1988, the government, as mentioned, 
intended to ease the accessibility of funding for savings banks as the new capital 
requirements were announced. This meant that the savings banks got access to capital 
without fulfilling all requirements met by companies with issued stocks. 
Historically, savings banks have been attractive investments because of their high 
exposure to the most profitable segments in banking; the private segment and small-
to-medium sized corporations. Furthermore, their large portion of private to corporate 
loans has led to a generally low risk exposure of savings banks (ABG Securities 
2000). The ABG report also states that the primary capital certificates were still 
attractive to investors in 2000, but the institutional and foreign investors kept their 
distance, as shown in Figure 3. The result was accordingly that investors required a 
higher cost of equity compared to investments in banks with issued stocks.   
One of the main challenges revealed in ABGs assessment, on the expected future of 
primary capital certificates, was related to the low and decreasing attractiveness of 
primary capital certificates towards institutional and foreign investors. Regardless of 
their attractive pricing, low risk and high dividend yield, the primary capital 
certificates had become increasingly unattractive due to decreasing liquidity, small 
banks size and dilution of ownership (ABG Securities 2000). 
3.1 Systematic Risk 
Since its introduction, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Lintner 1965; 
Mossin 1966; Sharpe 1964) has been widely used and acknowledged by financial 
academics and professionals when assessing the risk and expected return relationship 
of risky securities. CAPM was developed as a simplification of Markowitz (1952) 
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and is based on his views on diversification and mean-variance efficient portfolios. 
Consequently, one of the core assumptions underlying CAPM is that the market 
portfolio is mean variance efficient. The simplification of this model relates to the 
reduced number of covariance terms, which again results in easier calculations. The 
CAPM can be written as:  
                          
CAPM tries to predict ex-ante or expected returns of securities. It has the benefit of 
being “simple” in its structure, since it is a single index one period model, which only 
assumes two types of risk; systematic and unsystematic. More specifically, the 
systematic risk is a non-diversifiable macroeconomic risk which the security is 
exposed to. How sensitive the security is to macroeconomic changes can be explained 
by the slope coefficient β. Unsystematic/idiosyncratic risk on the other hand is firm-
specific and diversifiable when combined with multiple securities in a portfolio. The 
simple structure of CAPM is also one of the main reasons for its broad practice in the 
financial industry. 
3.1.1 Empirical Model 
The empirical model of the CAPM is often referred to as the “Single index model”. In 
this model, the assumptions underlying CAPM are removed and the model is 
rewritten to ex-post returns. This is a common model to apply when estimating 
systematic risk on individual assets. The reason why is because β of the single index 
model turns out to be the same as the CAPM β, except that the theoretical market 
portfolio of CAPM is replaced by an observable market index proxy (Bodie, Kane, 
and Marcus 2011).  
3.1.2 Assumptions and Implications Underlying CAPM 
As Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2011, 308) states, “The capital asset pricing model is a 
set of predictions concerning equilibrium expected returns on risky assets”. Thus, to 
make the CAPM testable, a set of assumptions must be applied. These assumptions 
are;  
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1) There are many investors with low wealth compared to the total market 
wealth. Investors are price takers, where prices are unaffected by individual 
trades. 
2) One identical holding period for all investors. 
3) Investments are limited to a universe of publically traded financial assets and 
borrowing and lending is risk free. 
4) No taxes or transaction costs 
5) Investors are rational mean-variance optimizers, which mean that the 
Markowitz portfolio selection model is used. 
6) There are homogeneous expectations among investors. 
Furthermore, these assumptions lead to a set of implications: 
1) All investors will hold the market portfolio 
2) All investors will choose a combination of the tangency portfolio and the risk-
free asset, to achieve optimal capital allocation (CAL). The market portfolio 
will be the tangency portfolio, which combined with the risk-free asset results 
in the capital market line (CML). 
3) The risk premium of the market portfolio is:  
            
 ,  
Where:  
Ā   Average degree of risk aversion across investors  
  
   Variance of the market portfolio 
4) The risk premium of individual assets is: 
   
          
  
  
The risk premium of an individual security is: 
         
          
  
 [        ]               
3.1.3 Empirical Tests 
Since CAPM was introduced in the 1960’s, it has been empirically tested by multiple 
researchers. Among the most recognized are Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972); 
Fama and French (1992); Fama and Macbeth (1973). Black, Jensen, and Scholes 
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(1972), cited in (Elton et al. 2009, 340) find that low beta stocks seem to perform 
better than what CAPM predicts, while the opposite applies for high beta stocks. 
They therefore grouped stocks on the basis of beta size and found that a straight line 
describes asset returns well, as suggested by theory. Fama and Macbeth (1973) find 
that the relationship between expected return and beta is positive and linear and that 
unsystematic risk does not explain average returns. Both their slope and intercept 
estimates are different than what CAPM predicts, but the difference is not significant 
and thus they do not reject CAPM. Fama and French (1992), find that when the tests 
allow for variation in β unrelated to size, the relation between β and average return is 
weak or nonexistent. Hence, they conclude that CAPM does not describe average 
stock returns. 
3.1.4 Limitations of CAPM 
CAPM has been questioned by several academics for its limitations. Among them, 
(Acharya and Pedersen 2005; Amihud and Mendelson 1986; Fama and French 1992; 
Merton 1987; Roll 1977)). The critique mainly concerns the testability of CAPM and 
the failure of the strong assumptions, but also the return variability not explained by 
the single factor. Roll (1977) pointed out that the CAPM is not independently testable 
as the market portfolio is unobservable.  
3.1.5 Time Varying Beta 
Researchers have found that CAPM does not manage to capture time varying changes 
in market risk premium and beta properly over time. Ferson (1989); Ferson and 
Harvey (1991, 1993); Ferson and Korajczyk (1995); Jagannathan and Wang (1996) 
cited in Akdeniz, Altay-Salih, and Caner (2003, 4) argue that time variation in beta 
and market risk premium should be incorporated in the static CAPM. When looking 
at two separate periods as chosen in this thesis, our calculations will not be able to 
capture the full picture regarding systematic risk. On the contrary, researchers do not 
have a clear view on how to capture this time variation. Many researchers model 
variations in beta by using continuous approximation with the theoretical framework 
of the conditional CAPM (Akdeniz, Altay-Salih, and Caner 2003). Ghysels (1998) 
find that despite efforts to model time variation in β risk, the constant β models in 
many cases yield on average better predictions. He claims that betas change through 
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time very slowly and thus the conditional CAPM may have the tendency of 
overstating the time variation and produce too volatile β estimates, which leads to 
large pricing errors. Ghysels (1998) therefore concludes that it is better to use the 
static CAPM as the search for a satisfactory specification is still far from 
accomplished.  
3.1.6 Changing Correlations 
When elaborating about what may implicate our results, it is also important to 
recognize that researchers have shown that correlations between asset classes change 
during market downturns. Silvapulle and Granger (2001) find that the average 
conditional correlation within a sample of 30 Dow Jones Industrial stocks is much 
higher when the market movements are negative then when the movements are 
“normal”. This phenomenon is likely to impact our β estimates as our sample 
includes the largest financial turmoil in modern time. The financial crisis will thus 
have the likely effect of increasing the β estimates since correlations are likely to 
increase between savings banks and the OSEAX during this period.   
Despite its limitations and incompleteness, CAPM is widely acknowledged within 
financial literature to be a good measure of systematic risk. As academics and 
professionals cannot agree on a better model that can replace CAPM, we choose to 
apply the single index model to assess the banks systematic risk. 
3.2 Liquidity 
3.2.1 Liquidity in Primary Capital Certificates 
The consensus among Norwegian professionals was that the liquidity, measured by 
turnover, of primary capital certificates was low and decreasing, as stated in a report 
by ABG Securities (2000). The table in Exhibit 5 shows the turnover of primary 
capital certificates, and clearly illustrates a decreasing trend in the years 1996-2000. 
According to ABG Securities (2000), low liquidity has also been one of the main 
drivers for low attractiveness among institutional and foreign investors. As a result of 
the regulations of 2009 it was expected to see improved liquidity as the security 
would have broader similarities to common stocks, due to increased influence and 
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lower/no dilution of ownership share. Furthermore, as mentioned, it was expected to 
see a decrease in dividend payouts (Becker 2009).  
Findings by Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt (2007) suggests that there is a link 
between dividend policy and liquidity. Their results imply that dividend and liquidity 
act as substitutes to investors. Therefore, as there were imposed restrictions on 
dividend payouts for Norwegian savings banks in 2009, their theory suggests that 
liquidity should have improved. As we know, this was also one of the effects the 
industry hoped to see. 
3.2.2 Liquidity in Asset Pricing 
Research suggests that one of the limitations of the standard CAPM model is the 
expected impact of liquidity on return (Amihud and Mendelson 1986). Since Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986) released their paper, multiple researchers have looked at the 
effect of liquidity on asset pricing. Findings by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) 
suggest that expected asset returns are increasing with (relative) bid-ask spreads. 
Although several studies discuss the impact and relevance of liquidity in asset 
pricing, researchers do not agree on a common measure for liquidity risk (Acharya 
and Pedersen 2005; Amihud 2002; Pástor and Stambaugh 2003). 
Many researchers agree that liquidity/illiquidity is an important factor within asset 
pricing. However, as liquidity is not directly measurable, different proxies for 
liquidity has been developed to capture the causalities that might exist. Amihud 
(2002, 32) states that: “It proposes that over time, the ex-ante stock excess return is 
increasing in the expected illiquidity of the stock market”. Amihud (2002) 
implemented new tests to cover additional effects such as the effect that realized 
illiquidity has on expected illiquidity. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) applied 
Amihud’s (2002) measure in empirical tests. Their findings suggest that L-CAPM has 
greater explanatory power than CAPM. 
Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), present a different model that tries to capture the 
impact of traded volume on expected stock excess returns. They find that a stocks 
order flow induce larger return reversals when liquidity is low. Consequently, they 
suggest that increased liquidity should be associated with smaller price impact on 
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expected excess return. Their liquidity measure γ works as a proxy for liquidity cost, 
and we have decided to implement their model to assess the liquidity of Norwegian 
equity certificates. 
3.2.3 Time Varying Liquidity Risk 
A study by Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) find evidence that liquidity betas vary 
across two distinct states, one with high liquidity betas and one with low betas. In 
addition, they find that the liquidity betas change over time. In our study this may 
mean that any change in liquidity may be due to market-wide factors and not solely 
due to the regulation change in 2009. Thus, our results may be affected by changed 
market wide conditions for all securities after the financial crisis.  
4.0 Data 
4.1 Research Period 
The research period range from 27.12.2001 to 27.12.2012 using weekly returns and 
volume. We use the whole period 27.12.2001 – 26.12.2012 (574 observations), the 
first period 27.12.2001 – 02.07.2009 (392 observations) and the last period 
03.07.2009 – 26.12.2012 (182 observations). The motive for dividing our data into 
these periods is to look at the transition from primary capital certificates to equity 
certificates on July 1
st
 2009. We split the periods on the Wednesday closest to the 
transition from primary capital certificate to equity certificate (02.07.2009). These 
two periods enables us to test if the systematic risk and the cost of liquidity have 
changed from the first to the second period. The reason why we also have the whole 
period is to compute the rolling window β.  
4.2 Banks Sample 
The equity certificate index includes 20 savings banks per 26.12.2012 (Exhibit 8). We 
have selected a set of criteria to choose which banks to include in our analysis. The 
selection criteria are comparable to Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), but used on weekly 
data rather than daily: 
- The equity certificate have been traded on Oslo Stock Exchange during the 
whole research period 
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- The equity certificate has been traded at least 75% of the weeks in each sub-
period 
From the first criteria, we can exclude KLEG, NTSG, SOAG as they were all listed 
on Oslo Stock Exchange later than 2002. ROGG changed company form to limited 
company in 2012 and converted consequently its equity certificates to stocks. ROGG 
is therefore excluded from our sample. The last criterion is equal to what Pástor and 
Stambaugh (2003) use in their article. They choose to exclude stocks that were traded 
less than 15 days (out of 20 trading days) in any given month. We apply the same 
trading percentage (75%) on weekly data. Based on these two criteria, we end up with 
ten savings banks; HELG, MING, MORG, NONG, PLUG, SADG, SBVG, SPOG, 
SVEG and TOTG (Exhibit 9). 
4.3 Data Needed to Measure Changes in Systematic Risk 
We use weekly returns of the securities and the equity certificate index 
(OSEEX/GFBX) as well as the OSEAX. These are collected from OBI-data, which 
are calculated from Wednesday to Wednesday. If an equity certificate is not traded on 
a Wednesday, the closest trading day prior to that Wednesday is used. The returns are 
adjusted for dividends, stock splits and other corporate events. The 3-month NOK T-
bill rate is de-compounded to weekly rates and averaged over the week to serve as a 
proxy for the risk free rate. 
4.4 Data Needed to Measure Changes in Liquidity 
To assess the liquidity according to the model of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) we 
use weekly traded volumes and returns of the equity certificates/primary capital 
certificates. We calculate the daily traded volume based on the closing prices each 
day multiplied by the number of traded stocks that day. This is because VWAP prices 
are not available. The weekly traded volume is then calculated as the sum of traded 
volumes from Wednesday to Wednesday. The weekly return on OSEAX is used as 
the market index to compute the excess return of the equity certificates relative to the 
market. Finally, we create a sign-variable based on the excess return of the equity 
certificates relative to the market. 
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4.5 Adjustments 
The volume data includes both seasoned equity offerings and public divestiture. 
These extreme values are adjusted for by using Winsorizing (Hasings et al. 1947). 
The reason for applying Winsorizing rather than trimming is because we do not want 
to exclude abnormally large trading volumes which have an impact on return. As 
such, we are trying to reduce the large trading volumes which do not have an impact 
on returns. The Winsorizing method reduces the extreme values to the highest value 
of a given percentile. More specifically, we compute the average weekly volume for 
each bank in the research period and the respective standard deviation. By adding 
three times the standard deviation to the mean we obtain a value corresponding to the 
99.7th percentile of the normal distribution. All values above this “cut-off” value will 
be reduced to this value (Exhibit 10). 
5.0 Methodology 
5.1 Systematic Risk 
To assess whether there are significant changes in banks systematic risk, we apply the 
single index model (Bodie, Kane, and Marcus 2011, 277). This is a statistical model 
of returns which point to two sources of uncertainty for a security; the systematic 
macroeconomic factor and the unsystematic microeconomic factor, which is assumed 
to be random. The assumptions underlying this model indicate that assets tend to 
move together and are determined by the same market forces. The model assumes a 
linear relationship between the excess return on a stock with the excess return of the 
market to describe the sensitivity of a stock to market movements. The sensitivity 
factor (β) can be described as; 
   
          
   
 
Where, the covariance between the asset and the marked is divided by the market 
variance. The single index model thus assumes that the structure of correlation 
depends on one single factor. This common macroeconomic factor in our model is the 
Oslo all share index while the Norwegian three-month T-bill is used as the risk free 
rate. By examining the β of each equity certificate as well as the β of the equity 
certificate index (OSEEX) in both periods, we can statistically test whether the 
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systematic risk of the instrument has changed after the regulation was introduced. We 
may thus infer if the instrument has become more contingent on market movements 
than before. The regression equation we want to implement is: 
           (     )      
(Eq.1)                     
 
Where: 
    Excess return on stock i 
    Excess return on the market 
    Risk free interest rate 
    Securities expected excess return when       
    Sensitivity to market movements (systematic risk) 
   Unexpected firm-specific (microeconomic) zero mean 
component of the return  
From ABG Securities’ (2000) assessment of savings we know that professionals 
characterized the risk of primary capital certificates as low. This is also what  Strøm, 
Hole, and Lie (1995) find in their thesis when they in essence look for differences in 
systematic risk between savings banks with primary capital certificates and 
commercial banks. Consequently, we expect to find that the average beta of savings 
banks to be lower than the market risk.  
Finally, in order to compare the systematic risk estimates in period one and two, we 
implement the Wald test. With this test we can test the hypothesis that the β’s are 
equal in the both periods. The Wald test equation can be written as: 
  
 ̂    
  
 
  
 ̂    
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Where: 
     ̂     
     ̂     
By subtracting the first period estimates from the second period, and divide by the 
standard error, we are able to say whether the differences in β values are statistically 
significant.  
As β change slowly through time (Ghysels 1998), we compute the 78 week rolling 
window of β’s in effort to give further insights to the development in systematic risk.  
5.2 Liquidity 
The impact of liquidity on return is a highly discussed topic within asset pricing 
theory. As mentioned, several researchers have proposed different models on how 
liquidity may impact returns. Our goal is to measure if the cost of liquidity for equity 
certificates has declined, as this will reflect increased liquidity according to Pástor 
and Stambaugh (2003). This is interesting to investigate since increased trading 
activity was one of the results the industry hoped for. Given that theory by Banerjee, 
Gatchev, and Spindt (2007) also suggest that dividend and liquidity work as 
substitutes to investors, we expect to see lower liquidity cost associated with order 
flow after 2009. Thus, we are not trying to identify whether liquidity has an effect on 
the pricing of equity certificates, as we assume it does impact return. We therefore 
choose to apply Pástor and Stambaugh’s (2003) liquidity cost measure with some 
modifications. The method results in a coefficient estimate which represents the cost 
of liquidity (Pástor and Stambaugh 2003). High liquidity should be related to a small 
price impact and a small γ, while low liquidity will have the opposite effect. 
Our analysis will differ slightly from Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) in terms of what 
we want to achieve. Additionally, they use different selection criteria and data 
frequency. As the whole population of savings banks with equity certificates consists 
of only 20 instruments (per 26.12.2012), we have a much smaller sample than Pástor 
and Stambaugh (2003). We will not implement the liquidity cost factor into an asset 
pricing model. We rather want to find the cost of liquidity associated with order flow 
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and compare across the two sub periods. Thus, as mentioned we do not want to assess 
whether liquidity is priced in the assets returns. 
We choose to implement a criterion which is close to what Pástor and Stambaugh 
(2003) use when choosing stocks. They look for stocks that have been traded 15 or 
more days during a month with 20 trading days. As such, we have excluded the 
equity certificates that have not been traded more than 75% of total trading weeks in 
our sample period. Weekly data is used due to the fact that these returns are the only 
ones available which are corrected for the frequent secondary equity offerings within 
this industry. This is in contrast to the monthly average of daily volumes which 
Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) use. As a result of our selection criteria, we have to 
exclude 10 banks (Exhibit 9), which means that we have only 10 banks left in our 
sample.  
The regression function of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) is: 
(Eq.2)         
                     (    (     
 )       )           
 
         
Where:   
       
   Is the excess return of stock i on week w+1 in period t relative 
to the value weighted market index 
         
   Is the sign of the excess returns of stock i on week w in  
period t relative to the value weighted market index 
       Is the return of stock i on week w, in time t 
       Is the NOK trading volume of stock i on week w, in time t 
     Is the coefficient that measures the expected return reversal for 
a given level of trading volume. 
In their article, γ is compared to another liquidity measure which they simulate over 
50,000 daily values. Their result gives a R
2
 of 0.98; therefore Pástor and Stambaugh 
(2003) have confidence in that γ is a good proxy for liquidity cost. 
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Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) state that the OLS estimated slope coefficient  ̂    is an 
imprecise measure for single stocks.  Thus, they average the stocks γ values each 
month according to the following formula: 
(Eq.3)  
 ̂  
 
 
∑ ̂   
 
   
 
As the disturbances in γ estimates are less than perfectly correlated across stocks, the 
 ̂  above will give a more precise estimate of the average liquidity cost. The average 
liquidity cost of the sample is thus equally weighted. As Pástor and Stambaugh 
(2003) measure the liquidity for the whole market, they have N= 951  2,188. We 
use the same approach, but we only have 10 securities to average, and we will 
therefore only be able to eliminate some of the disturbances in γ compared to a larger 
sample size. As we use weekly data instead of daily data, some of the noise will be 
reduced as a result of data selection. Finally, Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) scale  ̂  
since a trade of $1 is different in the start of the period compared to the end.  
         ̂   ̂  
  
  
 
Where: 
     Total market value of the stocks in the portfolio at time t 
     Market value at the beginning of the period  
We choose to calculate the γ-values of each equity certificate according to a 26 week 
rolling window as this is the lowest number of weeks we believe is justifiable to get 
reasonable results from the OLS estimation. The rolling window estimation is in 
contrast to Pástor and Stambaugh’s monthly estimations. The justification for using a 
rolling window is because it will give us more estimates compared to estimating 
every 26 month period separately. It will also make it easier to see developments in γ. 
Furthermore, this means that our liquidity estimates include weekly values for half a 
year, while Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) use daily values within a month. After 
calculating all the γ-values, we average every 26 week rolling window according to 
Eq.3, and multiply the average with the scaling factor to differentiate between NOK 
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value traded in 2002 and 2012. We exclude the estimates that include data from both 
periods. Consequently, we do not have γ-values until 26 weeks into each period. 
We choose to scale up the values of γ like Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), such that 
they are more “readable”. We therefore multiply the γ-values with 100 million.  
According to Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), γ is expected to have a negative sign, 
because trading volume is inversely related to stock returns. However, the opposite 
may be the case in certain situations. Llorente et al. (2002) cited in Pástor and 
Stambaugh (2003, 647-648) state that asymmetric information can weaken the 
reversal effect and even cause volume-related continuation in returns for stocks where 
information motivated trading is important. Additionally, Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000) cited in Pástor and Stambaugh (2003, 648) state that momentum effects in 
monthly returns are stronger for stocks with high recent volume. Thus, research 
supports that positive γ can stem from multiple sources, among them information 
based trading and momentum effects. 
Finally, in order to test whether γ has changed from period one to period two, which 
is something Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) do not assess, we have chosen to apply an 
ANOVA test to compare means between the periods. The test will give us the 
opportunity to evaluate whether the mean γ-value are significantly different in the 
two periods based on the two periods variance.  
6.0 Analysis 
6.1 Systematic Risk 
One of the assumptions underlying the OLS method is that the error terms are 
assumed to have constant variance. If that is not the case, it will not bias the  ̂, but a 
violation means that the estimates do not have the minimum variance property. The 
result of not correcting for this is that the standard errors are affected, and it may lead 
to wrongful conclusions. As we detect heteroscedasticity in both periods using 
Whites test, we correct for this using Whites “heteroscedasticity consistent coefficient 
covariance” available in EViews. Another assumption underlying OLS is that the 
error terms are uncorrelated with one another.  If this is not the case, they are 
autocorrelated. The Durbin Watson test only detects autocorrelation of first order, but 
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we want to check if there are any autocorrelation of higher order. The Breusch-
Godfrey serial correlation test is therefore implemented for this purpose. As a result, 
we choose to adjust for autocorrelation where it is detected by using the Newey-West 
technique which produce “heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent” standard 
errors. We choose to fix the number of lags equal to the highest number of lags where 
we detect autocorrelation in each regression, given an upper limit of 5 lags.  
The reason why we choose to correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, even 
though they do not affect the β estimates, is because both of them affect the standard 
errors. As we use the standard errors in the Wald test, they may affect the results and 
conclusions drawn from this test. These measures are only taken for the static CAPM 
model, not the 78 week rolling window β estimates. 
Additionally, we test for non-normality in the error terms. Looking at the Jarque Bera 
values in both periods, we observe that we have a non-normal distribution in the error 
terms in both periods. According to Brooks (2008) the non-normality is less 
problematic when we have many observations. Violation of this assumption will bias 
the coefficient estimates, but it will be more severe with a low number of 
observations. Small sample sizes may affect the coefficient estimates such that our 
inferences may be wrong, but the impact on the coefficient estimates will be less 
biased when the number of observations increases, appealing to a central limit 
theorem. We do observe non-normality in the data, but as we have many observations 
(392 and 182), according to Brooks (2008, 163) we do not make an effort of 
constructing a dummy variable to try to correct for it. We keep in mind that we may 
have biases in the coefficient estimates due to non-normality.   
The savings bank index gives β estimates of 0.359 and 0.550 in period one and two 
respectively, with R² values of 0.246 and 0.428 (Exhibit 11 & 12). To find whether 
the second period β differs from the first period β, we proceed to the Wald test. By 
setting the null hypothesis to  ̂    , we find that the difference between the two 
periods is statistically significant at the 1% level (Exhibit 13). This is an indication 
that the structure of savings banks instruments may have changed after 2009. 
However, it is difficult to isolate the effects of the financial crisis, thus these results 
may be a result of changed market dynamics after the financial turmoil in 2008.  
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When looking at the individual banks, only three of the ten savings banks in our 
sample have β’s in period two that are significantly different from the β in period 1 
(MING, SADG and SVEG) (Exhibit 13). What we do notice is that the level of noise 
related to individual banks is very high, making it hard to draw any definitive 
conclusions, as one would anticipate. Thus, it is better to only assess the index as it is 
characterized by less noise.  
An interesting observation however is that 8 out of 10 banks, in addition to the 
OSEEX, have higher R
2
 values in period two than they had in period one. This 
indicates that the market movements now explain more of the variation in returns 
than they did before 2009. This may again be in line with the intentions of having an 
instrument that more closely resembles common stocks. On the contrary, this might 
also be a result of increased correlation between assets during the financial crisis 
(Silvapulle and Granger 2001). In such a case, we would expect both the R
2
 and 
systematic risk to increase in correspondence to what this market phenomenon 
suggests. 
As stated above, our study is based on the static CAPM model, but in effort to give 
further insights to the development in systematic risk during our sample period, we 
calculate the rolling β-values with a 78 week rolling window. We acknowledge that 
Ghysels (1998) conclude that these estimates are too volatile. Consequently, we have 
chosen to have rather many observations in the rolling window to reduce some of the 
noise and volatility associated with small sample sizes. We calculate these β’s to see 
if there are any patterns that may strengthen our findings suggesting increased 
systematic risk in the OSEEX/GFBX index.  
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Figure 5: 78-Week Rolling Window β-estimates of GFBX/OSEEX 
By computing a 78-week rolling window of β’s over the entire period, it is not 
apparent that we have a defined shift in the β estimates at the end of June 2009, or 
related to news releases of the new instrument. Nonetheless, it may seem like there is 
a positive trend in β estimates in the second period. We observe that there are also 
clearly higher β estimates in the beginning of the period. This may be explained by 
the fact that in 2002 the Norwegian banking sector had the highest number of deficits 
since the banking crisis in Norway (1987-1991) (Exhibit 14). The unemployment rate 
was increasing and the growth in the Norwegian economy had decreased (The 
Norwegian Savings Banks Association 2006). As previously stated, correlation 
between assets has been found to increase during market downturns, thus affecting β 
estimates. We observe that the instruments sensitivity to market movements coincide 
well with investor uncertainty. Thus, whether the increase in systematic risk is due to 
changes in instrument characteristics or market dynamics is hard to isolate from one 
another. Accordingly, we may state that it seems like the instrument has an increased 
exposure to market risk, but we are unable to comment upon why that is.  
6.2 Liquidity 
The estimates of the γ-values from the 26 week rolling windows of the first period 
give an average value of -0.0357. We observe that throughout the estimation period 
there are two large liquidity drops. The first period clearly appears to have a 
connection to the economic situation in 2002, as mentioned above (Exhibit 14). The 
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second liquidity drop is during the financial crisis. Both drops correspond well with 
the assumed impact of market turmoil experienced by Pástor and Stambaugh (2003). 
Figure 6: 26 Week Rolling Window γ-values (Equally Weighted and Scaled for Time Value) 
We observe that the γ-values of the primary capital certificates are positive for longer 
periods of time. This is in contrast to what Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) find. They 
find that the values occasionally are above zero, but the majority of time it is below. 
By choosing a period between the two liquidity drops (averaging the values from 
01.01.2004 – 31.12.2008) we find that the γ’s are on average positive. As mentioned, 
this is in contrast to the expectations of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003). The positive 
values therefore indicate that there were continuations in excess returns related to 
order flow of primary capital certificates. These continuations, as mentioned, could 
be related to momentum effects and/or information based trading.  
 
As stated in Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), increased liquidity should be associated 
with a lower γ-value in absolute terms. This is because increased liquidity should 
result in lower price impact as a result of order flow. The average γ-value of the 26 
week rolling windows from period 2 is -0.01977, which is lower than what we get 
from period one. We observe that there are no extreme liquidity drops like the two we 
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had in the first period. We detect some positive values in period two, but they seem to 
be less frequent than what we identified in the first period.  
 
Figure 7: 26 Week Rolling Window γ-values (Equally Weighted and Scaled for Time Value) 
Looking at the summary statistics of the average γ-values from the two periods, we 
observe that the variance in period two is much lower than period one. Most of this 
variance seems to stem from the large liquidity drops in both 2003 and 2008. The 
ANOVA test shows that average γ in period two is lower in absolute terms than in 
period one, but the difference is not statistically significant. Thus, we may not reject 
the hypothesis of unchanged liquidity. This is in contrast to our expectations. 
However, the means are very sensitive to sample period. If we for instance had 
excluded the first two years of the first period, which means that we would have 
excluded the first large liquidity drop, the difference between the two periods would 
be statistically significant (Exhibit 15). Looking at the turnover from 2002 – 2012, we 
observe that, if anything, it seems like the traded volume has gone down during our 
sample period (Exhibit 16). As mentioned, parts of the first and second period are 
influenced by the financial crisis, and thus it is problematic to isolate the change in 
liquidity as a result of the regulation in 2009.   
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Table 1: ANOVA Test for Difference in Liquidity Cost 
 
7.0 Conclusion 
7.1 Systematic risk 
The empirical results suggest that the systematic risk of equity certificates has 
changed after the regulation in 2009. Although the results are in line with our initial 
expectations, the results are unreliable due to several factors. The results of the fiscal 
year 2002 were characterized by a large number of deficits among Norwegian savings 
banks (Exhibit 14). As a result we see higher β values from the rolling window 
estimations in the beginning of the first period compared to the following years. It is 
also observable that the β’s increase following the financial crisis. Whether this is a 
consequence of the new instrument introduced July 1
st
 2009 or merely an effect of 
changed market dynamics after the financial turmoil in 2008 is hard to assess. Thus, 
we are unable to pinpoint the reason for the change, but from the static CAPM model 
we are able to infer that the OSEEX/GFBX has statistically significant higher β in the 
second period. When assessing the individual savings banks, it is harder to get a clear 
picture as the data are characterized by a lot of noise, and accordingly this is reflected 
in low R
2 
values. We observe that the R
2
 values has increased in 8/10 banks, and for 
the OSEEX/GFBX. This may indicate that the excess return of equity certificates is 
better explained after 2009. Whether this is due to the new instrument, which was 
supposed to have broader similarities to stocks rather than a fixed income security, is 
uncertain. It may also stem from increased correlations between equity certificates 
and other securities, due to changed market dynamics after the financial crisis. 
Therefore, we are able to state that the β is significantly higher in period two, but 
unable to draw any definite conclusions related to what causes this change.   
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance Std. Dev
26.06.2002 - 24.06.2009 366 -13,0668 -0,0357 0,01738 0,131832
30.12.2009- 26.12.2012 157 -3,10353 -0,01977 0,00286 0,053481
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 0,027895 1 0,027895 2,140487 0,144059 3,859369
Within Groups 6,789776 521 0,013032
Total 6,817671 522
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7.2 Liquidity 
The empirical results of the liquidity cost are not able to reject the hypothesis of 
unchanged liquidity as a consequence of the regulation in 2009.  Thus, we cannot 
state that the liquidity has improved for equity certificates.  The results found by 
Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt (2007) suggests a link between dividend policy and 
liquidity, and that they act as substitutes to investors. Despite the fact that dividend 
payouts now should be lower, and their results imply that liquidity should hence 
improve, their results do not hold in our empirical study.  
The high number of banks with negative results in 2002 clearly shows a sharp 
liquidity drop. This drop coincides well with investors uncertainty related to the 
banks future earnings. The same applies for the liquidity drop observed during the 
financial crisis. Both drops correspond well with the assumed impact of market 
downturns suggested by Pástor and Stambaugh (2003).  
An interesting feature of our results is that we obtain some puzzling observations 
from period one related to γ-values. We observe that for longer periods of time they 
are positive. Looking at the in sample period from 2004 to end of 2008, we observe 
that the majority of γ-values are positive. This is in contrast to the reversal effect 
suggested by theory, and thus implies that our portfolio of 10 savings banks seemed 
to have continuations in excess return related to order flow before the regulation. 
Theory by Llorente et al. (2001) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000) cited in Pástor and 
Stambaugh (2003, 647-648) suggests that this can stem from momentum effects or 
information based trading. It therefore seems reasonable to believe that the positive 
values may be a result of one of these factors. The positive values are a lot less 
frequent in period two, and we observe that the majority of γ-values are negative. 
Consequently, period two seems to be more in accordance with theory.  
Despite the differences in the two periods related to the sign of γ-values, we are not 
able to reject the hypothesis of unchanged cost of liquidity with the ANOVA test. 
Taking a look at the turnover of equity certificates from 2002 – 2012 it may in fact 
seem like the traded volume to market capitalization has decreased (Exhibit 16). If 
liquidity had improved, we would also expect the turnover to have increased. 
Consequently, this may be in accordance with the perception of unchanged liquidity. 
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We observe that the mean values are very sensitive to sample period as the two 
liquidity drops heavily bias our means. Consequently, selection of sample period will 
impact the conclusions drawn. By excluding the first liquidity drop to validate the 
robustness of our result, we find that the p-value of the ANOVA test decreases below 
the 5% level, thus inferring that the liquidity has changed (Exhibit 15). As a result, 
the weak robustness of this empirical study makes us unable to draw any definitive 
conclusions regarding change in liquidity. 
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Appendix 
Exhibit 1: Number of Norwegian Savings Banks 1922 – 2012  
 
Exhibit 2: Market Capitalization of Norwegian Savings Banks – June 2013 
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Exhibit 3: Primary Capital Certificate Bank Structure 
 
 
Exhibit 4: Capital Priority List 
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Exhibit 5: Turnover of Primary Capital Certificates and Stocks Issued by Banks 
 
 
Exhibit 6: Equity Certificates Bank Structure 
  
Source: ABG 
Securities (2000) 
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Exhibit 7: Established Foundations Since 2002 
ESTABLISHED SAVINGS BANK 
FOUNDATIONS 
  
 Sparebankstiftelsen DNB 
 Stiftelsen Sparebanken Bien 
 Sparebankstiftelsen Sauda 
 Sparebankstiftelsen Tingvoll 
 Sparebankstiftelsen Gran 
 Sparebankstiftelsen Jevnaker Lunner Nittedal 
 Sparebankstiftelsen Ringerike 
 Sparebankstiftinga Fjaler 
 Sparebankstiftinga Sogn og Fjordane 
 SpareBank 1 - stiftinga Kvinnherad 
 Sparebankstiftelsen Helgeland 
 Sparebankstiftelsen SpareBank 1 Nord-Norge  
 Sparebankstiftelsen SMN 
 Sparebankstiftelsen Hardanger 
 Sparebankstiftelsen Halden 
 Sparebankstiftelsen Østfold Akershus 
 Sparebankstiftelsen SR-bank 
 Sparebankstiftelsen Telemark - Holla og Lunde. 
 Sparebanken Telemark - Grenland 
 Sparebankstiftelsen Hallingdal 
 Sparebankstiftelsen Øystre Slidre 
SAVINGS BANKS FOUNDATIONS 
BEING ESTABLISHED 
 Sparebankstiftelsen Lillestrøm 
 Sparebankstiftelsen Sparebanken Sør 
 Sparebankstiftelsen Bø. Kapital 
 Sparebankstiftelsen Seljord 
ESTABLISHED 
 
2002 
2007 
2009 
2009 
2010 
2010 
2010 
2010 
2010 
2010 
2010 
2011 
2011 
2011 
2011 
2011 
2012 
2012 
2012 
2012 
2012 
 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
CAPITAL 
(MILLION) 
NOK 7.900 
NOK 100  
NOK 160 
NOK 140  
NOK 500  
NOK 460  
NOK 800  
NOK 130  
NOK 1.800  
NOK 370  
NOK 690  
NOK 150  
NOK 100  
NOK 530  
NOK 340 
NOK 510 
NOK 2.900 
NOK 325 
NOK 325 
NOK 850 
NOK 105 
 
 
 
NOK 300 
NOK 600 
NOK 180 
NOK 130 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sparebankstiftelsen DNB (2012) 
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Exhibit 8: Listed Savings Banks on the Oslo Stock Exchange with Ticker Name 
SAVINGS BANK 
 Aurskog Sparebank 
 Helgeland Sparebank 
 Hol Sparebank 
 Høland og Setskog Sparebank 
 Indre Sogn Sparebank 
 Klepp Sparebank 
 Melhus Sparebank 
 SpareBank 1 SMN 
 Sparebanken Møre 
 Nes Prestegjelds Sparebank 
 SpareBank 1 Nord-Norge 
 SpareBank 1 Nøtterøy – Tønsberg 
 Sparebanken Pluss 
 SpareBank 1 Ringerike Hadeland 
 Sandnes Sparebank 
 SpareBank 1 Buskerud-Vestfold 
 SpareBank 1 Østfold Akershus 
 Sparebanken Øst 
 Sparebanken Vest 
 Totens Sparebank 
 SpareBank 1 SR-Bank 
TICKER 
AURG 
HELG 
HOLG 
HSPG 
ISSG 
KLEG 
MELG 
MING 
MORG 
NESG 
NONG 
NTSG 
PLUG 
RING 
SADG 
SBVG 
SOAG 
SPOG 
SVEG 
TOTG 
ROGG 
 
Source: Oslo Børs (2012) 
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Exhibit 9: Selection Criteria for Savings Banks by Traded Weeks
 
Period 1 - 27.12.2001 to 01.07.2009 AURG HELG HOLG HSPG ISSG KLEG MELG MING MORG NESG NONG
Traded weeks 206 342 247 179 253 65 288 392 392 291 392
Non traded weeks 186 50 145 213 139 327 104 0 0 101 0
% non traded weeks 47 % 13 % 37 % 54 % 35 % 83 % 27 % 0 % 0 % 26 % 0 %
Average weekly volume 136 459 1 865 811 105 341 81 657 156 202 162 127 366 952 18 928 081 6 401 094 388 716 10 515 159
Period 2 - 02.07.2009 to 26.12.2012
Traded weeks 156 180 60 66 144 149 138 182 182 169 182
Non traded weeks 26 2 122 116 38 33 44 0 0 13 0
% non traded weeks 14 % 1 % 67 % 64 % 21 % 18 % 24 % 0 % 0 % 7 % 0 %
Average weekly volume 172 718 1 533 405 22 239 29 739 94 114 88 004 160 150 21 811 406 3 143 495 239 670 6 925 999
Exclude/Include Exclude Include Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Include Include Exclude Include
Period 1 - 27.12.2001 to 01.07.2009 NTSG PLUG RING SADG SBVG SOAG SPOG SVEG TOTG ROGG
Traded weeks 78 356 230 390 321 163 389 384 383 391
Non traded weeks 314 36 162 2 71 229 3 8 9 1
% non traded weeks 80 % 9 % 41 % 1 % 18 % 58 % 1 % 2 % 2 % 0 %
Average weekly volume 150 652 806 178 127 721 2 550 809 348 969 757 046 2 563 798 1 757 948 1 140 809 10 686 362
Period 2 - 02.07.2009 to 26.12.2012
Traded weeks 148 163 130 182 169 161 182 180 182 130
Non traded weeks 34 19 52 0 13 21 0 2 0 52
% non traded weeks 19 % 10 % 29 % 0 % 7 % 12 % 0 % 1 % 0 % 29 %
Average weekly volume 204 916 228 224 3 633 994 1 993 788 469 899 412 593 3 849 276 2 193 073 847 735 9 769 155
Exclude/Include Exclude Include Exclude Include Include Exclude Include Include Include Exclude
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Exhibit 10: The Winsorizing Method - Reducing Extreme Values (Three Std. Dev.)
HELG MING MORG NONG PLUG SADG SBVG SPOG SVEG TOTG
Std.Dev 5 274 915    19 334 274    9 001 020      19 817 229    1 465 717    4 270 110    930 433       4 207 852    3 564 363    1 297 890 
Average 1 504 267    17 734 794    4 972 562      8 765 791      670 175       2 136 464    359 022       2 674 949    1 948 215    925 173     
Average + 3 Std.Devs 17 329 012 75 737 617    31 975 621    68 217 477    5 067 325    14 946 793 3 150 320    15 298 504 12 641 303 4 818 843 
Number of Adjustments 8 7 11 1 17 11 7 10 13 17
Largest Weekly Volumes
1 75 282 500 330 164 324 106 758 070 487 443 298 17 337 400 69 667 885 16 518 668 67 220 206 45 233 563 9 710 300 
2 62 792 969 108 256 015 102 736 296 49 945 051    14 628 495 42 576 339 9 778 682    28 416 041 31 542 476 9 379 436 
3 52 026 678 104 773 328 92 446 825    47 176 750    11 212 930 25 197 800 5 647 380    27 403 874 25 185 150 9 172 400 
4 45 757 706 93 858 100    67 569 389    42 044 153    8 973 250    18 102 779 5 258 075    25 482 597 24 804 091 8 318 633 
5 28 056 893 88 843 671    55 379 424    41 605 124    8 466 985    18 000 000 5 131 932    19 055 580 22 330 750 7 722 550 
6 25 805 195 81 811 665    48 723 111    40 100 657    7 972 400    16 693 995 4 737 050    19 028 767 18 244 450 6 512 300 
7 22 776 497 81 602 030    44 855 652    39 870 349    7 271 800    16 450 811 4 040 400    17 763 590 16 725 400 6 474 193 
8 19 636 592 69 321 132    43 431 943    37 594 173    6 942 725    16 276 822 3 125 288    16 830 015 15 879 569 6 059 785 
9 13 760 303 65 321 155    40 723 500    36 251 555    6 720 225    15 592 450 2 800 000    15 561 463 15 716 348 5 704 300 
10 12 511 200 64 789 265    36 394 534    34 599 812    6 662 600    15 276 535 2 608 928    15 445 657 15 693 817 5 678 288 
11 11 813 538 61 920 182    35 338 979    32 123 142    6 612 912    15 222 051 2 552 000    14 624 290 14 527 750 5 618 995 
12 11 221 170 61 217 780    29 587 850    31 960 495    6 339 575    14 384 525 2 101 000    14 333 847 14 147 394 5 460 900 
13 11 212 415 59 398 719    28 637 036    31 674 952    6 150 000    13 871 196 2 069 250    13 992 102 14 003 531 5 384 644 
14 10 863 324 57 108 835    25 935 975    30 295 900    6 095 350    13 352 585 1 918 000    13 664 560 12 290 200 5 266 107 
15 10 537 956 56 669 613    23 900 300    29 829 258    5 965 279    13 202 563 1 858 800    13 106 914 11 677 548 5 161 200 
16 10 051 662 54 760 024    23 774 785    29 756 500    5 944 195    12 219 450 1 858 100    12 879 574 11 546 140 5 127 001 
17 9 862 812    54 599 307    22 245 746    29 553 700    5 912 192    11 967 022 1 832 100    12 506 044 10 931 710 4 925 900 
18 9 848 199    54 100 730    21 528 586    29 294 437    4 971 550    11 905 890 1 799 786    12 355 455 10 918 368 4 686 568 
19 9 789 002    53 559 445    21 140 558    27 947 217    4 496 250    11 510 572 1 772 180    12 350 578 10 066 996 4 666 385 
20 9 700 809    53 240 149    20 961 575    27 929 858    4 204 030    11 151 985 1 750 625    12 345 117 9 673 158    4 627 500 
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Exhibit 11: β Estimation of GFBX 02.01.2002 – 01.07.2009 
 
Exhibit 12: β Estimation of OSEEX 08.07.2009 – 26.12.2012 
 
Dependent Variable: R_GFBX-RF
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 02.01.2002-01.07.2009
Included observations: 392
HAC standard errors & covariance (Prewhitening with lags = 3, Bartlett
        kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 6.0000)
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.000456 0.001290 0.353690 0.7238
R_OSLO_ALL_SHARE-RF 0.359339 0.035362 10.16170 0.0000
R-squared 0.246206     Mean dependent var 0.001060
Adjusted R-squared 0.244273     S.D. dependent var 0.024515
S.E. of regression 0.021311     Akaike info criterion -4.854071
Sum squared resid 0.177127     Schwarz criterion -4.833809
Log likelihood 953.3979     Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.846041
F-statistic 127.3824     Durbin-Watson stat 1.933264
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: R_GFBX-RF
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 08.07.2009-26.12.2012
Included observations: 182
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.000328 0.001260 -0.260367 0.7949
R_OSLO_ALL_SHARE-RF 0.550454 0.060889 9.040334 0.0000
R-squared 0.428323     Mean dependent var 0.000841
Adjusted R-squared 0.425147     S.D. dependent var 0.022310
S.E. of regression 0.016915     Akaike info criterion -5.310319
Sum squared resid 0.051500     Schwarz criterion -5.275110
Log likelihood 485.2390     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.296046
F-statistic 134.8632     Durbin-Watson stat 1.951318
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Exhibit 13: β Estimates using OLS and Test for Difference using Wald’s test  
 
HELG MING MORG NONG PLUG SADG SBVG SPOG SVEG TOTG OSEEX
0,152 0,485 0,304 0,465 0,105 0,435 0,096 0,338 0,283 0,195 0,359
Heteroscedasticity No Yes No No No Yes No Yes No No Yes
Autocorrelation (-1) and (-2) No No (-1) and(-4) (-1),(-2) and (-4) (-2) (-1) and(-4) (-2),(-3) and (-4) (-1) No (-3)
R² 0,013 0,156 0,139 0,152 0,018 0,142 0,007 0,069 0,092 0,042 0,246
0,262 0,733 0,134 0,500 0,073 0,859 0,170 0,444 0,442 0,389 0,550
Heteroscedasticity No Yes No No No No No No No No Yes
Autocorrelation No (-1) and (-2) (-1) (-1) (-1),(-2) and (-3) No (-1) and (-5) No No (-2) No
R² 0,061 0,278 0,023 0,156 0,004 0,146 0,010 0,131 0,165 0,076 0,428
Wald p-value  0.1543  0.0363  0.0866  0.7388  0.6730  0.0069  0.5641  0.2167  0.0327  0.0670  0.0020
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Exhibit 14: Savings Banks with Negative Results 
 
 
Exhibit 15: ANOVA Test (Excluding the Liquidity Drop in 2002 – 2003)  
 
 
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance Std. Dev
01.01.2004 - 24.06.2009 287 -0,62787 -0,00219 0,009954 0,09977
30.12.2009- 26.12.2012 157 -3,10353 -0,01977 0,00286 0,053481
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 0,031364 1 0,031364 4,2098 0,04078 3,862583
Within Groups 3,293045 442 0,00745
Total 3,324409 443
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Exhibit 16: Turnover of Primary Capital- and Equity Certificates 2002 – 2012  
 
 
